Introduction
In order to treat risks, decision makers (or managers) have to make decisions on proper countermeasures to be implemented to mitigate the risks. However, investment decisions are complicated. An organization needs the best possible information on risks and countermeasures to decide what is the best investment. This involves deciding which countermeasure offers a good trade-off between benefits and spending. The countermeasure expenditure, together with its ability to mitigate risks, are factors that affect the selection. Inappropriate and overexpensive countermeasures are money lost. Therefore, a systematic method that helps to reduce business exposure while balancing countermeasure investment against risks is needed. Such a method would thereby help answering questions like "(1): How much is it appropriate to spend on countermeasures?" and " (2) : Where should spending be directed?" as highlighted by Birch and McEvoy [4] .
Unfortunately, there exists little support for the prescriptive and specific information that managers require to select cost-effective risk countermeasures. Several cost estimation models have been proposed but most are only loosely coupled to risk analysis. For example, the Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM) [7] is well-suited to evaluate risk reduction but is very vague on the issue of cost effectiveness. Likewise, [1] suggests several methods to assess cost of risks (e.g., Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay), but none of these methods provides specific support to evaluate countermeasure expenditure. Chapman et al. [8] propose a framework which justifies mitigation strategies based on costdifference but does not take the benefit-difference (i.e. level of risk reduction) between strategies into consideration. Effective decision-making requires a correct risk model incorporating multiaspect information on countermeasures and a method to select cost-effective countermeasure alternatives. The multi-aspect information should contain the knowledge about the countermeasures themselves, their expenditures and suitability to mitigate risks, as well as the impacts they can have on each other. The focus of this paper is not on how to obtain this information, but rather on how to make use of this information to select effective risk countermeasures. In particular, we propose a systematic approach to integrate such multi-aspect information to reason and make recommendations regarding cost-effective countermeasure alternatives. We are not aware of other approaches of this kind. Our approach is sufficiently generic to allow it to be combined with many existing risk analysis methods. In this paper, we demonstrate this by instantiating our generic approach in the CORAS method for security risk analysis [16] with concrete illustrative examples.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our generic approach. Next, in Section 3 we exemplify the approach by instantiating it in the CORAS method. We present related work studies in Section 4. Finally, we summarise and draw conclusions in Section 5.
Our Approach
This section describes our approach aiming at the selection of cost-effective countermeasures for unacceptable risks. Section 2.1 provides an overview of this process and a conceptual model on which it builds. In Section 2.2 we describe the expectations to the risk model resulting from the risk assessment process and taken as input to our treatment assessment process. Finally, in Section 2.3 to Section 2.5 we describe its three main steps in further detail.
Process Overview
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , our approach takes a risk model resulting from a risk assessment and the associated risk acceptance criteria as input and delivers a set of recommended countermeasure alternatives as output. Hence, the approach assumes that risk assessment has already been conducted, i.e. that risks have been identified, estimated and evaluated and that the overall risk analysis process is ready to proceed with the risk treatment phase. We moreover assume that the risk analysis process complies with the ISO 31000 risk management standard [13] , in which risk countermeasure is the final phase. Our process consists of three main steps as follows:
Step 1 Annotate risk model: Identify and document countermeasures. The results are documented by annotating the risk model taken as input with relevant information including the countermeasures, their cost, their reduction effect (i.e., effect on risk value), as well as possible effect dependencies (i.e., countervailing effects among countermeasures).
Step 2 Perform countermeasure analysis: Enumerate all countermeasure alternatives and reevaluate the risk picture for each alternative. The analysis makes use of the annotated risk model and a calculus for propagating and aggregating the reduction effect and effect dependency along the risk paths.
Step 3 Perform synergy analysis: Perform synergy analysis for selected risks based on decision diagrams. The outcome is recommended countermeasure alternatives which cost-effectively mitigates the selected risks. Fig. 2 presents the conceptual model, expressed as a UML class diagram [23] on which our approach builds. A Risk Model is a structured way of representing an unwanted incident and its causes and consequences using graphs, trees or block diagrams [22] , or tables [16] . An unwanted incident is an event that harms or reduces the value of an asset, and a risk is the likelihood of an unwanted incident and its consequence for a specific asset [13] . A Countermeasure mitigates risk by reducing its likelihood and/or consequence. The Expenditure includes the expenditure of countermeasure implementation, maintenance and so on. The Reduction Effect captures the extent to which a countermeasure mitigates risks. The Reduction Effect could be the reduction of likelihood, and/or the reduction of consequence of a risk. The Effect Dependency captures the countervailing effect among countermeasures that must be taken into account in order to understand the combined effect of identified countermeasures. The Calculus provides a mechanism to reason about the annotated risk model. Using the Calculus, we can perform countermeasure analysis on annotated risk models to calculate the residual risk value for each individual risk. A Decision Diagram facilitates the decision making process based on the countermeasure analysis. 
Input Assumptions
The input of our approach is a risk model generated by a risk assessment, and risk acceptance criteria. To ensure that our approach is compatible with several risk modeling techniques, we expect the risk model could be understood as a risk graph instantiation. A risk graph [6] is a common abstraction of several established risk modeling techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA) [11] , event tree analysis (ETA) [12] , attack trees [24] , cause-consequence diagrams [17, 22] , Bayesian networks [9] , and CORAS risk diagrams [16] . Hence, our approach complies with these risk modeling techniques, and can be instantiated by them. A risk graph is a finite set of vertices and relations (see Fig. 3 ). Each vertex v represents a threat scenario, i.e. a sequence of events that may lead to an unwanted incident, and can be assigned a probability p, and a consequence co. A leads-to relation from v 1 to v 2 means that the former threat scenario may lead to the latter. Probabilities on the relations are conditional probabilities indicating the likelihood of the former to lead to the latter when the former occurs.
Detailing of Step 1 -Annotate Risk Model
This step annotates the input risk model with required information for further analysis. There are four types of annotation as follows:
Countermeasure: In risk graphs, countermeasures are represented as rectangles. In Fig. 4 there is one countermeasure and this is named cm.
Expenditure: In risk graphs, expenditure is expressed within square brackets following the countermeasure name (e in Fig. 4 ). This is an estimated of the total amount of money spent to ensure the mitigation of countermeasure including expenditure of implementation, deployment, maintenance, and so on.
Reduction effect: In risk graphs, reduction effect is represented by a dashed arrow decorated by two numbers (pr and cr in Fig. 4) . It captures the mitigating effect of a countermeasure in terms of reduced likelihood (i.e. probability reduction -pr ), reduced consequence (i.e. consequence reduction -cr ), or both. Both pr and cr are relative percentage values, i.e. pr, cr ∈ [0, 1].
Effect dependency: In risk graphs, effect dependency is represented by a dashdot arrow with solid arrowhead decorated by two numbers (effect on probability reduction (epr), and effect on consequence reduction (ecr) in Fig. 5) . It captures the impact of a countermeasure to the reduction effect of another, i.e. it can increase or decrease pr and/or cr of another countermeasure. The epr impacts pr while the ecr impacts cr. Both epr and ecr are relative percentage values, i.e. epr, ecr ∈ [0, 1].
Detailing of Step 2 -Countermeasure Analysis
The countermeasure analysis in this step is conducted for every individual risk of the annotated risk model. The analysis enumerates all possible countermeasure combinations, called countermeasure alternatives (or alternatives for short) and evaluates the residual risk value (i.e. residual consequence and probability) with resect to each alternative to determine the most efficient one. Residual risk value is obtained by propagating the reduction effect along the risk model to get the revised risk values. To this purpose, we have developed a calculus with propagation rules. An example of rule is shown as below.
Rule 2.1 (Countermeasure) If there is a treats relation from countermeasure cm to vertex v(p, co) with probability reduction pr and consequence reduction cr, we have: cm
Rule 2.1 applies to countermeasures as depicted in Fig. 4 . The probability reduction pr on the probability p of the scenario means that p is reduced by pr ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, p is multiplied by pr = 1 − pr. Likewise for the consequence reduction. The complete list of rules is presented in the Appendix B.
From the leftmost threat scenarios (i.e. scenarios that have only outgoing leads-to relations), probabilities assigned to threat scenarios are propagated to the right. During the propagation, probabilities assigned to leads-to relations and reduction effects of countermeasures are taken into account. Finally, the propagation stops at the rightmost threat scenarios (i.e. scenarios that have only incoming leads-to relations). Based on the results from the propagation, the residual risk value is computed.
Decision Diagram is a directed graph plotted in an X-Y plane for an individual risk as illustrated in Fig. 6 . A node in a decision diagram is a risk state, which is a risk with a certain alternative applied. A risk state is represented by a triplet: probability, consequence, and countermeasure alternative. The first two values are obtained from the propagation on the risk diagram. A risk state is plotted as a node in the X-Y plane with the probability as the X coordinate, and the consequence as the Y coordinate. The countermeasure alternative is annotated on the path from the initial state S 0 where no countermeasure applied.
To construct a decision diagram for a risk v, given C as set of countermeasures that can be implemented to mitigate v, we start at the initial state S 0 . Then, from an existing state S i , we reach new states by considering one or more further countermeasures in C. By applying the analysis, we can calculate the corresponding risk state. Notice that we ignore all states whose residual consequence and probability are both greater than those of S 0 since it is useless to implement such countermeasures.
Detailing of Step 3 -Synergy Analysis
The aim of the synergy analysis is to recommend a cost-effective countermeasure alternative for mitigating all risks, namely global countermeasure alternative. Such recommendation is based on the decision diagrams for the individual risks (generated in Step 2), and the risk acceptance criteria, and the overall costs (OC) of global countermeasure alternatives which are calculated as follows:
where ca is a global countermeasure alternative; R ca is the set of risks with respect to the global countermeasure alternative ca; rc() is a function that yields the loss (in monetary value) due to the risk taken as argument (based on its probability and consequence); cost() is a function that yields the expenditure of the countermeasure taken as argument. The synergy analysis is decomposed into three following substeps:
Step 3A Identify global countermeasure alternatives: Identify the set of global countermeasure alternatives CA for which all risks are acceptable with respect to the risk acceptance criteria. Decision diagrams of individual risks can be exploited for identifying CA.
Step 3B Evaluate global countermeasure alternatives: If no such global countermeasure alternative is identified (CA = ∅), do either of the following:
• Identify new countermeasures and go to Step 1, or • Adjust the risk acceptance criteria and go to Step 3A
If some global countermeasure alternatives are identified (CA = ∅), select a global countermeasure alternative ca ∈ CA with the lowest overall cost OC(ca).
Step 3C Decide cost-effective global countermeasure alternative: If OC(ca) is acceptable (for the customer company in question) then terminate the analysis. Otherwise, identify more (cheaper and/or more effective) countermeasures and go to Step 1.
The above procedure may of course be detailed further based on various heuristics. For example, in many situations, with respect to Step 3A, if the global countermeasure alternative ca ∈ CA, then we do not have to consider other global countermeasure alternative ca such that ca ⊆ ca. However, we do not go into these issues here.
Exemplification in CORAS
As a demonstration of applicability, this section instantiates the proposed approach into the CORAS method for security risk analysis [16] and exemplifies how the resulting extended CORAS method and language can be used to select cost-efficient risk countermeasures in an example drawn from a case study within the eHealth domain [21] .
The risk model in the CORAS method is captured by so-called risk diagrams. A risk diagram is a causality graph consisting of potential causes (i.e. threats) that might (or might not) exploit flaws, weaknesses, or deficiencies (i.e. vulnerabilities) causing a series of events (i.e. threat scenarios) to happen, which could lead to unwanted incidents with certain likelihood and concrete consequence (i.e. risks) to a particular asset. Threat scenarios and risks are also called core elements in the risk diagram notation.
In the risk diagram, there are two kinds of relationships with assigned likelihoods: initiate and leads-to relations. The former connects a threat to a core element, and the latter connects a core element to another core element. Likelihoods assigned to initiate relations can be either probabilities or frequencies, whereas, likelihoods assigned to leads-to relations are conditional likelihoods.
Any risk diagram can be understood as an instantiation of a risk graph; such conversion is formally defined in [6] . In this paper, to save space we adjust the steps of the generic method such that they work directly with CORAS artifacts. To make the instantiation more comprehensible, we also present a running example that exploits an eHealth scenario proposed by the NESSoS project [19] to exemplify the resulting extended CORAS method.
eHealth Running Example: Patient Monitoring
As illustrated in Fig. 7 , patients' behaviors and symptoms are monitored in realtime. This provides an improved basis for disease diagnoses and tailored therapy prescription regiments. Patients are equipped with sensors that continuously collect patients data and send these data to a handheld smart device (e.g., smart The patient has one or more monitoring devices in the form of wearable sensors. They provide data to an application in a handheld device, which does some processing on the data, aggregates the results and sends them to the eHealth Server. The patient and his devices are authenticated by an Identity Provider (IdP). phone). This smart device, in turn, sends the patient data to external eHealth servers where the patients' eHealth Records (EHRs) are updated.
The CORAS risk diagram in Fig. 8 presents a partial result from a risk analysis of the Patient Monitoring scenario [21] . In this risk diagram, network failure exploits the vulnerability unstable/unreliable network connection to initiate network connection goes down. Likewise, handheld HW failure exploits the vulnerability unstable/unreliable handheld HW to initiate handheld goes down. Both handheld goes down as well as network connection goes down may lead to the transmission of monitored data is interrupted. This, consequently, may lead to loss of monitored data which impacts the provisioning of monitoring service. The rest of the diagram is interpreted in the similar manner.
We assume in the following that this diagram is a consistent and complete documentation of risks identified during the risk assessment. We moreover use frequencies to estimate likelihoods of core elements. Reasoning about frequencies in the risk and treatment assessment is also supported by our calculus.
Applying Step 1 -Annotate Risk Model
In this step, we annotate the CORAS risk diagrams according to Step Treatment annotation: treatments can apply to most of the elements in a treatment diagram, including all types of core elements, threats, and vulnerabilities. Fig. 9 shows an example in which a treatment implement redundant network connection treats the scenario network connection goes down which was initiated by network failure by exploiting the vulnerability unstable/unreliable network connection.
Expenditure annotation: the treatment expenditure, annotated as value inside the treatment bubble, is the total expenditure spent for a treatment in a period of time. For instance, in Fig. 9 , the expenditure for implementing a redundant network connection is 5000USD:10y in ten year.
Reduction effect annotation: following Step 1, reduction effect in the CORAS instantiation is annotated on treats relations as a pair f r, cr , where f r, cr are frequency reduction and consequence reduction, respectively. For example, in Fig. 9 , the frequency of network failure is thirty times in ten years, annotated as 30:10y. In a CORAS diagram, we suffix the value of f r and cr with the letter 'L' and 'C', respectively, to distinguish between them. The treatment implement redundant network connection only reduces the frequency (not consequence) of unreliable network connection by 0.7 at cost 5000USD:10y. This means the reduced frequency is (1 − 0.7) · 30:10y = 9:10y.
Effect dependency annotation: in Fig. 9 , to mitigate network connection goes down, we could ensure sufficient Quality-of-Service (QoS) from network provider with the cost of 15000USD:10y. This, however, reduces the effect of a redundant connection. These two treatments are countervailing. Ensuring such QoS will reduce the reduction effect of a redundant connection by 0.3 as annotated in the figure.
As summary, Fig. 10 shows the treatment diagram resulting from annotating the risk diagram in Fig. 8 . Note that the likelihood annotations in Fig. 10 are after the application of the analysis of Step 2, which is explained next.
Applying Step 2 -Treatment Analysis
The analysis employs an instantiated version of the calculus for risk graphs. Here, we exemplify the propagation of likelihoods and reductions through an example taken from the annotated treatment diagram of the eHealth scenario. Particularly, we show how to do the propagation for risk "Loss of Monitored Data" (LMD). The result is presented in Fig. 10 . For clarity, we use following acronyms for text in the diagram:
-TDI: "Transmission of monitored Data is Interrupted" -NCD: "Network Connection goes Down" -HGD: "Handheld Goes Down" -NF: "Network Failure" -HHW: "Handheld HW failure" -IRN: "Implement Redundant Network connection" -EQS: "Ensure sufficient QoS from network provider" -IRH: "Implement Redundant Handheld"
Here we describe the frequency propagated for LMD. First, NF initiates NCD with frequency 30:10y. The treatment IRN would reduce this frequency by 0.7L. However, due to the effect dependency of EQS to IRN, the likelihood reduction of IRN is changed to 0.7L · (1 − 0.3L) ≈ 0.5L. Hence, IRN reduces the frequency propagated to NCD to 30:10y · (1 − 0.5) = 15:10y. EQS would reduce the frequency of NCD by 0.7L. So, the frequency propagated to NCD is 15:10y · (1 − 0.7) = 4.5:10y. Second, HHW initiates HGD with frequency 10:10y. This is propagated to HGD. IRH treats HGD with likelihood reduction 0.7L. Hence, frequency propagated to HGD is 10:10y·(1−0.7) = 3:10y. Since NCD and HGD are independent and both of them lead-to TDI, the frequency propagated to TDI is 4.5:10y · 0.8 + 3:10y · 0.9 = 6.3:10y. Finally, the propagated frequency of LMD is 6.3:10y · 0.8 = 5.04:10y.
Likewise we can calculate the frequencies of the entire diagram. Fig. 10 shows the complete diagram with frequencies calculated and annotated. Note that in Fig. 10 we have calculated the likelihoods when all treatments are taken into account. However, due to the effect dependencies it may be that implementing all treatments is not the optimal alternative. Fig. 11 
Applying Step 3 -Synergy Analysis
To facilitate the synergy analysis described in Step 3, we define the rc() function in (1) as follows: rc(r) = co·f , where co is the consequence and f is the frequency of the risk r. Having decision diagrams for individual risks, the synergy analysis described in Step 3 is detailed as below.
Step 3A We identify the set of global treatment alternatives based on the decision diagrams generated in the previous step and the expenditures of treatments. For each risk, we select the alleged cost-effective treatment alternatives. In particulary, we choose S3 LM D {IRH, IRN } (i.e. state S3 of risk LM D), and S7 LM D {IRH, IRN, EQS}; for risk DAS, we choose S3 DAS {U SW, IRH}, and S2 DAS {IRH}; for risk LID, we choose S3 LID {IRH, IRN } and S2 LID {U BA}. We assume all of these alternatives are acceptable with respect to the acceptance criteria.
Step 3B We calculate the overall cost for each global treatment alternative using (1). Table 1 reports the overall costs for these alternatives. According to this table, we select GS1 due to its smallest overall cost.
Step 3C For the sake of simplicity, we assume that customers are satisfied with the recommendation. Therefore, GS1 will be chosen for implementation. S3  S3  S3  101740  GS2{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW} S3  S7  S3  102340  GS3{UBA,IRH,IRN,USW}  S2  S3  S3  104500  GS4{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW}  S2  S7  S3  105100  GS5{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN}  S3  S3  S2  108740  GS6{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS}  S3  S7  S2  109340  GS7{UBA,IRH,IRN}  S2  S3  S2  111500  GS8{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS}  S2  S7  S2  112100 4 Related Work Mehr and Forbes [18] suggest that "risk management theory needs to merge with traditional financial theory in order to bring added realism to the decisionmaking process". In line with the suggestion, Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is often used with risk management to assess the effectiveness of risk countermeasures [2, 5, 25] . Major CBA steps include: a) develop measures to mitigate a certain problem b) develop measure alternatives c) estimate the impact and cost of each measure d) compare the benefit and costs for each measure alternative e) conduct a sensitive analysis of the uncertainty of estimated benefit and cost f ) recommend a cost-effective measure alternative for implementation. Our approach may be seen as a special case or refinement of this process. In risk management, decision on different risk mitigation alternatives has been emphasized in many studies [1, 20, 26] . The guideline in [26] proposes costbenefit analysis to optimally allocate resources and implement cost-effective controls after identifying all possible countermeasures. This encompasses the determination of the impact of implementing (and not implementing) the mitigations, and the estimated costs of them. Another guideline [1] provides a semiquantitative risk assessment. The probability, impact of risks are put into categories which are assigned with scores. The differences between the total score for 13 all risks before and after any proposed risk reduction strategy relatively show the efficiency among strategies, and effectiveness of their costs. It also suggests that the economic costs for baseline risks should be evaluated using one of the following methods: Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay, Qualified-Adjusted Life Years, Disability-Adjusted Life Years. However, these methods have not been designed to assess cost of treatments but rather cost of risks.
Norman [20] advocates the use of Decision Matrix to agree on countermeasure alternative. A Decision Matrix is a simple spreadsheet which contains a list of countermeasures and a list of risks which those countermeasures mitigate. For each countermeasure there are estimates with respect to cost, effectiveness, and convenience. The countermeasure effectiveness is measured by metrics contained within the Sandia Vulnerability Assessment Model. The proposed approach is however not clearly defined, and all metrics are developed as spreadsheets which are complicated to implement and follow. Meanwhile, our proposal is graphical and backed up with a formal definition and reasoning. Butler [7] proposes the Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM) to evaluate alternative security designs. It employs a four-step process, namely benefit assessment, threat index evaluation, coverage assessment, and cost analysis. This approach however focuses mostly on the consequence of risks rather than cost of countermeasures.
Chapman and Leng [8] describes a decision methodology to measure the economic performance of risk mitigation alternatives. The methodology is based on two kinds of analysis (baseline and sensitivity), four methods of economic evaluation, and a cost-accounting framework. The cost is broken down into several dimensions and types. The advantage is to provide a clear economic justification among mitigation alternatives. However, it does not differentiate alternatives based on their suitability to mitigate risks. In other words, the methodology focuses on the cost-difference aspect but does not take into account the benefitdifference (in terms of level of risks reduced) among alternatives.
Houmb et al. [10] introduce SecInvest, a security investment support framework which derives a security solution fitness score to compare alternatives and decide whether to invest or to take the associated risk. SecInvest relies on an eight-step trade-off analysis which employs existing risk assessment techniques for risk level. SecInvest scores alternatives with respect to their cost and effect, trade-off parameters, and investment opportunities. However, this approach does not provide a systematic way to assess the effects of alternatives on risks, either not take into account the dependency among countermeasures in an alternative.
There exist studies on Real Options Thinking [3, 14, 15] to articulate and compare different security solutions in terms of their business value. These solutions however are on the management aspect such as postpone, abandon, or continue to invest in security. Meanwhile, our alternatives are more focused on the technical aspect. The output of our approach could be taken as the input for Real Options Thinking based assessment.
Conclusion
We have presented a generic approach to select a cost-effective countermeasure alternative to mitigate risks. The approach requires input in the form of risk models represented as risk graphs. The approach analyses risk countermeasures with respect to different properties such as the amount of risk mitigation (Reduction Effect), how countermeasures affect others (Effect Dependency), and how much countermeasures cost (Countermeasure Expenditure). We have developed a set of formal rules extending the existing calculus for risk graphs. These new rules propagate the likelihoods and consequences along risk graphs thereby facilitating a quantitative countermeasure analysis on individual risks, and a synergy analysis on all the risks. The outcome is a list of countermeasure alternatives quantitatively ranked. These alternatives are represented not only in tabular format, but also in graphical style (Decision Diagram).
We have exemplified the generic approach by embedding it within the CORAS method. We extend the CORAS method with our approach in an example of the eHealth domain to select cost-effective treatments. Notations and rules have been adapted to comply with CORAS. The example demonstrates that our approach can work with existing defensive risk analysis methods whose risk models can be converted to risk graphs. 6 Relating CORAS to Risk Graphs 19
Formal foundation
In the following we introduce the formal machinery.
Basics
N and R denote the sets of natural numbers and real numbers, respectively. We use N 0 to denote the set of natural numbers including 0, while R + denotes the set of nonnegative real numbers. This means that:
For any set of elements, we use P(A) to denote the powerset of A.
A tuple is an element of a Cartesian product. We use π j to extract the j th element of a tuple. Hence, if 
Sequences
By A ∞ , A ω and A * we denote the set of all infinite sequences, the set of all finite and infinite sequences and the set of all finite sequences over some set of elements A, respectively. Hence, we have that
We define the functions
to yield the length and the nth element of a sequence. Hence, #s yields the number of elements in s, and s[n] yields the nth element of s if n ≤ #s. We also need functions for concatenation and filtering:
Concatenating two sequences implies gluing them together. Hence, s 1 s 2 denotes a sequence of length #s 1 + #s 2 that equals s 1 if s 1 is infinite, and is prefixed by s 1 and suffixed by s 2 , otherwise. The filtering operator is used to filter away elements. B S s denotes the subsequence obtained from s by removing all elements in s that are not in the set B .
Timed events
E denotes the set of all events, while the set of all timestamps is defined by
A timed event is an element of E × T
Histories
A history is an infinite sequence of timed events that is ordered by time and progresses beyond any finite point in time. Hence, a history is an element of
The first conjunct requires the timestamp of a timed event to be at least as great as that of its predecessor. The second conjunct makes sure that time will always progress beyond any finite point in time. That is, for any timestamp t and history h there is a timed event in h whose timestamp is greater than t.
We also need a function for truncating histories
The truncation operator captures the prefix of a history upto and including a certain point in time. Hence, h| t describes the maximal prefix of h whose timed events all have timestamps less than or equal to t. 
Frequencies
As explained above, we use the nonnegative real numbers to represent time. The time unit is equal to 1. For simplicity, we assume that all frequencies are per time unit. The set of frequencies F is therefore defined as follows:
Hence, f ∈ F denotes the frequency of f occurrences per time unit.
2 Risk graphs 2.1 Syntax of risk graph formulas
Risk graphs
A risk graph is a pair of two sets (V , R) where
We refer to the elements of V as vertices and to the elements of R as relations. We use v (f ) to denote a vertex, while v r − → v denotes a relation.
Vertex expressions
The set of vertex expressions is the smallest set X V such that
We need a function
that for any vertex expression yields its set of events. Formally, s is defined recursively as follows:
Risk graph formula
A risk graph formula is of one of the following two forms
Semantics of risk graph formulas
We use the brackets [[ ] ] to extract the semantics of a risk graph formula. If v ∈ P(E) we define:
The semantics of any other risk graph formula is defined recursively as follows:
Calculus of risk graph formulas
The three rules below correspond to rules 13.10, 13.11 and 13.12 in the CORAS book, respectively. There are some minor differences. In the CORAS book the real number decorating a leads-to relation is restricted to [0, 1] . The statistical independence constraint in Rule 13.12 of the CORAS book is not needed.
Rule for leads-to
(1) and (4) imply
(6) and (7) imply (5) and (8) imply (3).
Rule for mutually exclusive vertices
For simplicity we have merged four premises into two using logical conjunction.
Proof: (1) and (2) imply
(1) and (2) imply
, (5) and (6) imply (3).
Rule for separate vertices
(1), (2), (5) and the fact that
3 Introducing countermeasures
Formal foundation extended with countermeasures
We start by extending the basic formal machinery to take countermeasures into consideration.
Timed events with countermeasures
C denotes the set of all countermeasures. To record treatments each timed event is extended with a possibly empty set of countermeasures. A timed event with an empty set of countermeasures is untreated, while a timed event with a nonempty set is treated by the countermeasures in the set. Hence, a timed event is from this point onwards an element of
Histories with countermeasures
The notion of history is generalised straightforwardly to deal with timed events with countermeasures as follows:
is generalised accordingly. 
Syntax extended with countermeasures
The next step is to generalize the notion of risk graph.
Risk graphs
A risk graph with treatments is a tuple of five sets (V , C , R l , R e , R d ) where
We refer to the elements of V as the set of vertices, C as the set of countermeasures, and to R l , R e , R d as the leads-to relations, the effects relations and the dependency relations, respectively. We use v (f ) to denote a vertex, c to denote a countermeasure, 
Vertex expressions
We need a function s ∈ X V → P(E) that for any vertex expression calculates its set of events. Formally, s is defined recursively as follows:
Risk graph formula
A risk graph formula is of one of the following four forms
• c, c ∈ C where c = c ,
• cs ∈ P(C) where c, c ∈ cs,
• v ∈ P(E),
• r ∈ R + .
Semantics extended with countermeasures
The semantics of a risk graph formula is defined recursively as before. In particular, the definitions are unchanged in the case of
The vertex base-case must however be updated to take countermeasures into account:
Hence, we only take into consideration those events in v that are not treated by a countermeasure in cs.
In the case of the effects relation the semantics is defined as follows:
Hence, e is the fraction of v events whose set of countermeasures contains c but no countermeasure in cs. Also the dependency relation captures a fraction:
Hence, d is the fraction of v treated by countermeasure c that is also treated by countermeasure c. (2) and (4) imply
There are two cases to consider:
• Assume • Assume (11) f 1 = 0 (6), (7) and (11) • Assume (8) e = 0 (2), (8) and the semantics of the effects relation imply (3).
Introducing consequences 4.1 Formal foundation extended with consequences
We start by extending the basic formal machinery to take consequences into consideration.
Timed events with consequences
I denotes the set of all consequences (or impacts). To facilitate arithmetic operations on consequences we assume that
To record consequences each timed event is extended with an additional component characterizing the consequence of this event with respect to the various combinations of countermeasures. A timed event is from this point onwards an element of E × T × P(C) × (P(C) → I)
For any timed event e we require c ⊆ c ⇒ (π 4 .e)(c) ≥ (π 4 .e)(c ) Hence, adding a countermeasure will never increase the consequence.
Histories with consequences
The notion of history is generalised straightforwardly to deal with consequences as follows:
The truncation operator
| ∈ H × T → (E × T × P(C) × (P(C) → I)) * is generalised accordingly.
Syntax extended with consequences
Risk graphs
The notion of risk graph is a tuple of five sets (V , C , R l , R e , R d ) where
We use v (f , i ) to denote a vertex, (e f ,ei ) − −−− → to denote an effects relation and
− −−− → to denote a dependency relation. The remaining conventions are as before.
Vertex expressions
The notion of vertex expression is left unchanged.
Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.5.
Rule for arbitrary vertices
H v 1 (F 1 , I ) H v 2 (F 2 , I ) H v 1 v 2 ([max({min(F 1 ), min(F 2 )}), max(F 1 ) + max(F 2 )], I ) Soundness The upper bound corresponds to the case where the set of events of the two vertices in a history are disjoint, while the lower bound corresponds to the case where the set of events in a history belonging to one of the vertices is fully contained in the history's set of events belonging to the other vertex.
Relating CORAS to Risk Graphs
We distinguish between two kinds of CORAS elements, namely the set E UI of unwanted elements, and the set E TS of scenario elements. We assume that E UI ∩ E TS = ∅ We refer to the sequences in E TS * as the threat scenarios elements. An unwanted incident in CORAS may be thought of as a set of unwanted elements, while a threat scenario corresponds to a set of threat scenario elements.
A timed CORAS event is a quadruple of the following type (E UI ∪ E TS * ) × T × P(C) × (P(C) → I)
While an unwanted incident element is instantanious a threat scenario element is not. The timestamp of a threat scenario element denotes its time of termination. In CORAS only unwanted incidents may have a consequence. Hence, in the case of threat scenario elements, any set of countermeasures is mapped to 0.
The relationship between a timed CORAS event and a timed risk graph even is defined by a function map such that map(e, t, co, im) def = (m(e), t, co, im) where m ∈ E UI ∪ E TS * → E is a bijective function. This means that m(e) = m(e ) ⇒ e = e
